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Quaker Perspectives on the Nature of Man
WILMER A. COOPER
Ever since the dawn of human consciousness man has been
inquisitive about himself. A modern parable of this insatiable
desire of man to understand himself is expressed in the story of
an insane person who was found rushing about the house fran
tically looking in all the cupboards and clothespresses and
crawling under beds in search of something. When asked what
lie was looking for, he answered, “1 am trying to find myself.”
human nature is an enigma and a mystery, and the way
in which it has been appraised have helped to determine the
character of the major political and social philosophies of his
tory, and subscquently, the institutions of society. The issue of
man is just as alive today as ever, for what man may become in
clividually and collectively depends upon the kind of beings
we are.
The discussion of man which follows will take place within
the framework of Quaker thought, relating something of both
the historic (chiefly seventeenth century) and the contemporary
views held by Friends. At the same time an effort will be made
to formulate an adequate view of man which is consistent with
the central Christian beliefs and testimonies of Friends. The
topic will be dealt with under three major headings: (1) Man
as created in the image of God; (2) Man as sinner; antI (3)
Man’s hope of victory over sin anti death.

of God.” in Genesis 1:26 it is stated that man was created in
the very “image” and “likeness” of God.’ This concept of the
imago Dei sets forth the fundamental Hebrew-Christian af
firmation about man and his relationship to God. Although
man in creation was good, he did not remain so, for the ‘‘fall of
man” impaired his original state of perfection. Exactly how the
fall is to be understood is a very difficult problem, but embodied
in this conpt is a clue to the origin of man’s Predicament.
Many contemporary theologians do not think of the fall as an
historical event in the ancestry of mankind, but as something
which every man experiences in his personal history. in this re
spect, every man is good in creation, but like Adam, he invariably
falls into a state of separation from God, which is sin. This
means that the original image with which he was created is de
faced or destroyed so that the only means of its recovery is
through the redemptive process of God’s action through Christ,
the new Adam.
Turning to the thinking of early Friends, we discover that
George Fox held a clear conviction about the condition of man
before the fall. Canby Jones in his study of George Fox describes
the views of the founder of the Quaker movement in this way:
He be
He believed first in man’s original righteousness
lieved that God created man in His own image, and clothed
him with righteousness and holiness. Man lived then in a
blessed, happy and innocent state. He was perfect and God
gave him dominion over all the works o€ his hands. “Here
was a blessed concord and amity. Man was blessed, and so was
woman, and all things blest Unto them. Man was perfect. God
2
is perfect. All that he made was perfect.”
.

.

Christian thought holds that the universe to which man be
longs is not a product of chance or purely mechanical factors but
was created by God out of nothing (creatio ex nihilo). Since God
is believed to be supremely good, his activities and all that he has
cteated are held to be good. Man himself, as part of that crea
tion, was good in his original nature as it came from the “hand

Isaac Penington, another first generation Friend, was also
coin inced that man was originally perfect as made in the image
3 He
of God and that in the fall the image was completely lost.
says that man’s true relationship with God is one of “life” and
1
blessedness.”
Robert Barclay, the most systematic thinker of the early
Quaker period, seemed reluctant to speculate about man’s primi
to dive into
tive state. He said that he would not attempt
the many curious notions which many have concerning the con
.“5 Yet Barclay agreed with Fox
dition of man before the fall
and Pcnington that what Adam lost in the fall was “that true
fellowship and communion he had with God.” We may con-
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MAN AS CREATED IN THE IMAGE OF GOD

“

.

.

.

.

.

elude, therefore, front these and other similar iclerences that,
according to the belief of early Friends, man as created in the
image of God was thought to enjoy a life of perfect fellowship
with God.
Even though early Friends had a very clear notion of the
condition of man before the fall, they have never indulged in
excessive speculation about such matters. Indeed, their main
concern has been with the actual condition of man and what can
be done to effect his redemption from sin. Therefore, in con
sidering Friends’ views of the imago Dci, or the divine, Godgiven endowments available to iiian in creation, it is very un
portant to turn our attention to the Quaker concepts of the
Light, Christ, the Seed anti other similar terms. It is particularly
at this point that Friends have had a more exalted view 01 man
titan many other groups in the Christian tradition.
Friends have always been noted for their special preference
for the Gospel of John, which declares that a universal Light
lights every man that comes into the world (John 1:9)
Fox
an(l the early Quakers did not believe that this Light was a ila
tural endowment of man, as many contemporary Quakers hold.
They regarded it as a divine Light because it comes from Christ.
Students of Fox such as Rachel King and Canby Jones agree that
when Fox speaks of the Light he means both that the Light is
Christ and that it is from Christ. Most of the terms which Fox
uses, including Holy Spirit, the Seed, and the Measure, carry
much the same meaning. They reflect the grace of God available
to man through the living, inward Christ. One may pIcture
these gifts of God’s grace in a dynamic sense, available to enable
man to recover his true relationship with God and yet never the
property of man as such. It is important to grasp this under
standing for it places Friends in the mainstream of Christian
thinking about the ilnago Del. More and more this Christian
concept of man has come to mean a dynamic and reciprocal
i-c/a tionsi, 1/ of responsibility-in-love and of fellowship-in-love
between God anti man, rather than an innate human faculty,
capacity, or substantial quality such as is reason, freedom, cre
ativity, moral responsibility, or religious capacity. Sometimes
the imago is symbolized by a mirror in which man, when he is in
proper relationship to God, reflects the will and purposes of God.
.

4

I

If he is not in this proper relationship, lie fails to reflect God’s
will and stands then in a relationship of sin.
In any Quaker discussion of God’s gifts of Christ, the Light,
or the Seed, the question arises, to what extent are these inherent
in juan’s native capacities, or to what extent are they fresh gifts
of God’s Holy Spirit to man in every moment of existence? Is
it proper to say that man “possesses” certain capacities and po
tentialities by virtue of his existence as man? Even more perti
nent, to what extent may we say that mali has a nature? What
is the nature of this nature, or of the self, and does it possess a
given set of qualities which constitute a person’s identity and
character? These are questions which were pertinent in the early
Quaker discussion of what was “natural” to man and what was
not, and they are pertinent also to the contemporary discussion
of the nature of the self.
It has been customary to think of man as possessing a self
which has a substantive nature iii a metaphysical sense. The self
so conceived constitutes a soul which possesses worth and inde
pendence by virtue of its continuity with the Being of God. In
attempting to enlarge upon this idea we need to keep in mind
two heritages in our past. One is the Greek philosophical tra
dition which placed emphasis on timeless and eternal being, on
spiritual essences, and on the substantive and metaphysical na
ture of things. The secon(l is the Hebrew tradition which placed
greater emphasis on the objective and existential reality of time,
on the dynamic will of God, and on human decisions and his
torical cvents. In the former tradition man was thought to pos
sess a soul grounded in the order of Being and endowed with an
independent worth of its own. The Hebrew view, on the other
hand, not only saw man in relationship to God, but declared
that man’s worth and dignity are always derived from and are
dependent upon this personal relationship. Man in this context
does not have a nature so much as he has a history constituted
by the past which has made him what he is. Man is a creature
of decision, of will, and of freedom so that he both has a history
and also makes history. As Gordon Kaufman points out, man’s
uniqueness lies in the fact that he is “radically historical.” insofar
as he has a nature it is the capacity to possess a history, to have
freedom, and to make decisions.°

5

1he early Quaker view of man has a strong resemblance to
the latter, Hebrew, interpretation, namely, that juan stands in a
dynamic and responsive relationship to a God who speaks and
conimands through the medium of his Holy Spirit. Man has a
self and a nature oily as it is constantly sustaine(I by God and

as it (olistantly interacts with God in divine-human encounter.
Furthermore, man in response to God and other men makes spe
cific decisions, which means that he is a history-making creature.
Much of contemj3orary Ouakerisni, on the other hand, has
1
iui:lined toward the Greek, as opposed to the 1—Lebrew, view o
man in this respect. Both liberal arid I undamentalist tenden
cies anlong Friends have looked upon mait as having a substan
tive nature or soul which comes from God and, because of its
immortal character, returns to God. Liberal Ouakerism has
made much of the phrase, ‘‘that of God in every man’’—a term
taken from (;eorge Fox but greatly misused in the twentieth
century. As Canby Jones points out in his (lissertation on Fox,
this term had a meaning pira1le1 to that of Christ within, the
Light within, or the Seed, and did not mean that it represented
a capacity which inheres in man. It referred, rather, to a dy
naiinc oncept of God working in and through the life of man.
insofar as “that of God in every man” signifies a basic worth or
dignity in man, this worth is derived from God and not from
wan’s nature as such. A twentieth-century Quaker “heresy’’ has
been that of misusing the term ‘‘that of God in every man” in
such a way as not oniy to imply that maii’s worth and dignity
derive from an inherent goodness or divine spark, but also this
use of the phrase has been instrumental in developing a rationale
for a Quaker humanism which declares that Goof is parcelled out
in all men so that each man possesses “a piece” of the Divine.
The result of this misuse is that God is no longer considered
transcendent, dwelling in his own being above all, but has be
come wholly immanent. A radical immanence of this type can
easily become pantheism from a metaphysical point of view, or a
self-sustained humanism from an anthropological point of view.
This means that God is no longer necessary to man. At the
same time, it sidesteps the whole problem of evil in the world.
The assumption is that every man comes into the world possess
ing latent God-like qualities, which constitute a kind of “Stan6

dard equipment’’ for luni. Such a view of man makes prayer and
worship irrelevant. This is probably the reason that the son of
a prominent Quaker has remarked, “I (lofl’t believe l)addy be
lieves in prayer anymore.” When asked why, he replied, “Be
cause I don’t think 1)addy believes in God.” For such 1 persou,
Stoic resolve takes the place of prayer, and meditative ilimnina
flon takes the place of worship.
Although the fundamentalist Friend at the other extreme
has a strong “Christology” which assumes the helplessness of man
to save himself, and his need of Christ, there is a tendency in hint
to adopt a Platonic view of the dualistic nature of man. Man
is thought to have a soul which comes from God and is intended
to return to God upon death, unless it merits eternal damnation.
Thus the soul is believed to be that immortal part of man which
exists beyond death, and has the capacity to inhabit l)laces. This
seems to be largely a Greek or Gnostic view, whereas the 1-lebrewChristian concept is that man is animated by, or has breathed
into hint, a soul. This latter idea of the soul is best interpreted
as breath, life, sell or perlaps personality. At the same time this
soul is possessed for the Christian by a higher spirit, namely, the
Spirit of God or Christ.
7
Front whatever Quaker vantage point we flay attempt to
judge the nature of man there has been much of contemporary
Quaker religious thought. both liberal and conservative, which
has not only misunderstood the central biblical view of man but
has deviated from early Quaker interpretations in favor of Greek
influences, especially those of Stoicism on liberal Quakerism and
of Platonic dualism on conservative Quaker thought.
We must now leave behind our discussion of the Quaker
view of the image of God in man. Certainly, Friends have al
ways had a high view of the irnago, believing that it is sufficient
in man to enable him to overcome sin and become that which
he is intended to become. Friends have had little interest in the
orizing about an abstract state of “original perfection.” Rather,
their interest is in the goal of Christian perfection for man. The
irnago Dci is not for them a theological abstraction but should
be considered from a functional and operational point of view,
namely, that of the grace and power of love of God working in
7

and through the life of man and society to transform and perfect
them.
MAN AS SINNER

There is a common notion abroad that Friends do not take
sin and evil seriously, or perhaps that they do not even believe
in them. Insofar as this is true the misconception has arisen in
part from certain twentieth-century reinterpretations of histori
cal Quakerism. The assumption has been made that the real
spiritual forerunners of Fox and the early Quakers were the con
tinental mystics arid humanists. Coupled with this has been a
repudiation of the metaphysical distinction between God and
his world, taken for granted by early Friends, and in its place
has come a philosophical Idealism which has so emphasized
the immanence of God as virtually to lose sight of his trans
cendence. Such a view negates any real doctrine of creation and
is not equipped to take sin and evil seriously. Consequently, it
has no need for a thorough-going doctrine of redemption.
There is a sense in which any religious faith which stresses
the inwardness of religion, or which emphasizes the image of
God in man, or which places a premium on the Light within
tends to play down emphasis upon sin, and thus lessens the need
for a Messiah or Savior. But in spite of certain innovations in
Quaker thought during the past generation, there is no question
that early Friends had a thorough-going doctrine of sin and evil.
To try to give any other interpretation than this is to do violence
to historical facts.
In Fox’s own conversion experience he declared, “For all
are concluded under sin, and shut up in unbelief as I had
“S
been
Fox believed that through the disobedience of the
first man, Adam, all men lost their “original righteousness.” Both
Adam and Eve fell “from the purity, holiness, innocency, pure
and good estate, in which God placed them. So Adam died, and
Eve died; and all died—in Adam.”
9 Sin, therefore, is universal.
The root of it was Adam’s disobedience, but sin continues and
multiplies because of our disobedience.
Fox was only one among many seventeenth-century Friends
who held such a doctrine of sin. Isaac Penington went even
farther than Fox did. According to him man is by nature in
8

“a state of sin and darkness; a state of death and misery; a state
of enmity against God; a state accursed from God; exposed to
his wrath and most righteous judgments, both here and here
after.”° And then Penington outdid the Calvinists in this regard
when he wrote:
Men speak of the relics of the image which the first man had:
Ah! poor deceived hearts! What relics of life are tnere in a
(lead man? What relics of purity in a man wholly degenerated
and corrupted? Nay, nay; the spiritual image, the divine image,
the eternal life, the pure power and virtue is wholly lost; and
there is nothing left
.

.

spite of man’s lost condition the hope in Penington’s view
is to be found in his cloctrisie of the ‘‘seed.” It is not entirely
clear whether this is a principle of redemption resident in man,
hut it is in any case clear that divine action is needed to activate
the seed. He declares that “the earth [i.e., man’s sinful nature]
is not so much as prepared to receive the seed, until the Lord
send his plough in the heart.”la
A third seventeenth-century Quaker, Robert Barclay, was
no less certain of man’s sinful propensities when he states:
In

All Adam’s posterity, or mankind, both Jews and Gentiles, as
to the first Adam, or earthly man, is fallen, degenerated, and
that not only their words and deeds, bu:t all their
dead .
13
imaginations, are evil perpetually in the sight of God.
.

.

.

.

Although Barclay had a very deep sense of sin, he resembled the
Scholastics in making a distinction between the Light and Seed
on the one hand, and man’s natural capacity for reason on the
other. He said that
We look upon reason as fit to order and rule man in things
natural. For as God gave the greater light to rule the day, and
the lesser light to rule the night; so hath he given man the
light of his Son, a spiritual divine light, to rule him in things
spiritual, and the light of reason to rule him in things na
4
tural.l

Fox, Penington, and Barclay all concurred that sin is man’s
wilful disobedience or rebellion against God’s will. However,
they differed about sin as an inherited condition. For Fox and
Penington it was not only a condition of man but also an act of
disobedience. Because of Barclay’s great concern not to con
dernn infants to damnation he refused to ascribe Adam’s guilt
to any man until that person had made Adam’s sin his own by
9

1 Thus infants who arc not yet account
an act of disobedience.’
able have not transgressed God’s will until they consciously sin.
Turning from the early Ouaker view of man as sinner, we
shall now look at some contemporary Quaker points of view. In
the twentieth century Rufus Jones has probably had more influ
ence on Quaker thought anti practice than ally’ other one per
)Oiflt of his analysis of sin that lie differed
son.’° It is at the 1
markedly from his Quaker forebears. He held that the origin
of sin stems from mail’s struggle to emerge froni the biological
)c)int in luau’s emergence ‘‘in
t some 1
processes of nature.
stilict’’ and ‘‘moral insight’’ collide and Conscience is born. Man
gaiHs in knowledge of good and evil. At this conscious level we
.

no longer need to he governed by the unreflective push of in
stinct. Rather, we enter upoti a stage of struggle between the

lower impulses and the ideals and aspirations which are striving
to guide and shape our life. Siii results wlieii man’s will, i.e., his
whole sell, surrenders to the impulses and thrives of his ‘‘lower
nature” as opposed to the values and ideals which represent the
pull of his ‘‘higher nature.’’
Rufus Jones believed that there is a ctiii,ulative effect of sits
in terms of its consequences. Sinful acts produce a ‘‘set of the
nature” and the only way to overcome it is to get a new masi,
which means to undo his habit of sinning and develop in its
place a pattern of good I)ehavior. Rufus Jones did not regard
itlan as originally and fundamentally bad or depraved. If he
exercises his rational nature to master his lower impulses, then
he is on his way to spiritual health. If one learns to love good

ness anti feel au attraction to it, then he will naturally choose
the good as over against evil. Jones says:
To apologize for sin as though it belonged to man’s nature,
to assume that lie is a worm in the dust and necessarily evil
arc contrary to the entire idea of tile Quaker. Fallen he may
he, a stubborn sinner and degraded being, but that is because
he is not what he wa.s meant to be.17

dition evil is the absence of tile good, and sin is to be equated
with error or misjudgment. If the passions of the lower sell
disturb the rational calculations of tile higher self, then mistakes
will follow. But there is no sin committed in a personal sense.
l)ouglas Steere, who follows ill the same spiritual heritage
as Rufus Jones, would seem to diverge from his views as can be
dealt
seen in enlightening references which he has made to sin a
u
1
(
otation
following
with its St. Augustine’s Confessions. The
gives evidence of his sense of tile depth and seriousness of sin
from a Christian point of view:
In the light of this I begin to see what is meant by this here
(litary defiance of God (ailed “original sin,” which is so prolni
,aent in the treatises of Augustine. I begin to see that he is
only writing a commentary upon Jesus’ holding up as the ob
ject of his most bitter invective not the sins of the body but
the sins of pride, of selfishness, of hardness of heart, of selfAnd in this empisasis of Jesus and A ugustine
righteousness.
there setns to be a major cleavage with Greek thought as ex
pressed in such a mind as Plato. For in l’lato there is no talk
01 sin of the mind such as pride, that may keep man from
blessedness. For Plato, mind does not block or blind it_self, It
is matter that keeps the mind in darkness. it is tile unruly
iucds of the body and its lustful appetites that are opposed
to the character of the mind. It is the Iliologicai that retards
tile psychological, and if the mind could dominate all, if by
proper education the psychological could asstmnie supremacy
over tile biological, [or Plato all would be weil,IS

Douglas Steere presents the warning about Augustine’s doctrine
of sin that apart from his Confessions, ‘‘it remains a pre-Christian
19
legalistic formula, a forbidding and vicious dogma.”
is also less
Trueblood,
Elton
Quaker,
contemporary
Another
to the
referred
and
has
Jones
was
optimistic about man than
declares:
He
sin.
of
nature
“chronic’’ and “indigenous”
The point is that man is, qua man, a sinner, even in his
virtue. He may he able to overcome or to hold in check the
sins of the flesh, but his temptations will not end thereby. In
fact all agree that the sills of the spirit are far more terrible
Of all the sins that of spi
than are tile sins of the flesh.
ritual pride is probably the worst and the most damaging. It
is thus that Paradise is lost,20
.

.

.

The philosophical ioots of Rufus Jones’ view of sin are basically
Platonic in origin. Sin arises out of a conflict between the spi
ritual and physical realms. Seldom is sin regarded as a personal
affront against God or a defiance of his will. In the HebrewChristian tradition sin has always been highly personal—ass act
of disobedience against God and his will. In the Platonic tra

Elton Trtieblood injects a warning, however, for those who
would overemphasize the “itidigenous” character of sin. He says
that “a philosophy which would cut the nerve of moral effort
is an evil philosophy anti this is what is evil in either sheer op.
’ Moreover, he points out that the
2
timisni or sheer pessimism.”
doctrine of man as sinner never describes the “whole truth”

10
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about man. It is the gospel which teaches
that God reaches
out to every man and this. we need to know far more vividly.”
22
In the face of two world wars and so much tragedy in our
tune, much of the optimistic temperament about the nature of
man which prevailed earlier has now been superccclecl by a more
realistic view of man. In addition to the quotations drawn from
Douglas Steere and Elton Trueblood, other Quaker (lOcumenta
tioli of this could be given. At the same time a large segment
of American Friends who identify themselves as Evangelicals
have always retained a strong doctrine of sin Arthur Roberts,
writing as one of these, has stated, “Friends recognize that man
is depraved, in that he cannot of his own power or inclination
find salvation. Quakers are not so much optimistic about man
as they are optimistic about the power of Christ to save man.”m
There is another dimension of sin, however, which has be
come of major concern to us in the twentieth century, namely,
the social nature and consequences of sin. The Social Gospel
movement popularized a liberal version of the idea that men are
caught in a net of social evil, much of which they have inherited.
The contemporary version of this idea has been dramatized by
Reinhold Niebuhr, whose impact upon social thought has not
gone unnoticed by the Friends, though they have been slow to
understand the real nature and relevance of his argument. Cecil
Hinshaw says that although early Quakers did not subscribe to
any utopian view of the world, he doubts whether they under
stood as well as we do today
the extent to which man in
his corporate relationship in society normally engages in evil
that far transcends personal sin.”
24 He states further:
“

.

.

.

.

“.

.

.

Our vision of a new world and culture must never blind us
to the hard fact that even good men are caught up in the
magnetism of corporate sin and held by a power of attraction
difficult even for psychologists to explain.
5
2

where to
behave as nations with the same decency as they
would behave as men and brothers, to substitute the institutions
26 One could cite many
of peace for the institutions of war.”
Quaker statements of this type. It seems very difficult for
.

.

.

Friends to comprehend the complexity of group behavior and
group decisions, and to understand why organizational and na

tional affairs cannot be conducted on the same personal basis
of love as those of the faniily and small community. Kenneth
only small or
Boulding has quite rightly pointed out that
’ In the same reference he says
2
ganizations can be personal.”
that “a good deal of harm has been done by i;terpreting the
to mean that all
moral ideal of the ‘brotherhood of man’
liuniari organization must be like a family, in its looseness of
“

.

.

...

.

organization and its complexity of personal interaction.”
Douglas Steere has taken sharp issue with what he calls the

“collectivist theologians” of our time who have attempted to give

a theological rationale for a valid and relevant contemporary
Although he recognizes the service they have per
formed in their study and analysis of group sin, his general
criticism of this point of view sounds much like George Fox’s
charge against the Calvinists of his time, that they “preached up
sin to the grave.’’ Douglas Steere’s main interest is with the saint,
who he believes is able to bridge the gulf between personal and
group ethical behavior and to demonstrate the way of human
brotherhood in human relations. In championiag the saint as
an antidote to the “socio-theological pessimism” of our time,
social ethic.

he states:
The saint does not arrive at his ethical insight from a study
of the power ethics of mass-groups. He arrives at it from a
firsthand knowledge of the power of the I, the Me, and the
Mine in the heart of man and of the expulsive power of God’s
love to melt them down and to allow brotherhood to emerge.

Group egotism, group pride, and group sin are all intense
realities for the saint, and he knows them as a lump that is
hard to reduce. But he would not let the lump-like nature
of group sin intimidate him into accepting it as an ultimate
and irreducible surd. God has faced lumps of corporate sin
before, even lumps that were in their surroundings more co
herent and snore defiant than those of our day, and He has

The real crux of the problem for Friends is that few of
them make any distinction between personal ethics and social
ethics. Quakerism in both its conservative and liberal varieties
is today highly individualistic, carrying with it a personal
ethic which is supposed to be applied not only to the personal
affairs of the individual but to all the corporate decisions of
society. The Third ‘Vorld Conference of Friends held at Ox.
ford, England in 1952 declared: “We call upon people every-

These quotations and references serve to illustrate the fact
that although Quakers are noted for their social concern and

12

13

softened them up and often dissolved them.
25
that he does not work alone.

The saint knows

their atteilipi to demonstrate a living faith which has as its prod
uct a ital social ethic, their approach continues to be strongly
l)ersotlal. They place such a premium on the indivi(lual that even
in their own groups they manifest a lack of understanding of
the corporate complexities and ambiguities which are inherent
in social intercourse. It seems difficult for Friends to realize
that where groups of people are involved there isa multiplicity
of claims to be considered for every choice made and that clear
black and white decisions are ery uiicmninoii. Because Friends,
too, have to live with these situations all the time, they arc often
Ol)5CSSCLI with guilt feelings about the fact that decisions iii this
life are not always clearcut.
Another insight, arising chiefly from depth psychology,
which has not becit completely accepted by Friends, is that con
(ernmg the irrational aspect of man’s life at the deep levels of
the sell. This is what sonie theologians would call the “deiiionic
element’’ in man’s life, both in terms of his personal and his
corporate life. For example, Rufus Jones once deplored the fact
that inaii iii his “insane folly’’ “wrecked” the world between
1914-18. But in his analysis of the situation he shows little rec
ognition that man’s behavior is not always governed by reason,
and that irrational and demonic elements frequeHtly predom
inae. To recognize the ugly and evil side of man in terms of
the irrational drives which undergird much of his life is not to
degrade him, but should he a sign of moral and spiritual
1 1 a turi ty.
There is a sense in which the public’s view that Friends do
not take sin seriously is (orrect. Whether liberal or conservative,
Friends have a dogged assurance that man, if lie does what he
is supposc(l to do, will come out all right. If Friends are to be
honest with themselves and to avoid superficiality in their tinderstanding of juan, they must re-evaluate their view of man as a
sinner. If we believe that man’s image is most clearly reflected
when lie is doing the will of God, then we must surely know that
sin is present in a very real sense when man disobeys God’s will.
But. just as the image relationship may become a condition in
man, so sin may become a condition. Sin is something which
man 1)0th does and is. Because man is endowed with freedom
he makes choices against God’s will. Then he becomes a victim
‘

14

com
of his own sin and is in bondage. In this state he is not
Man
predicament.
his
to
solutions
saving
pletely free to bud
choices
past
his
of
all
that
in
creature
is a ‘radically historical”
condition those of the present. Sin is man’s creation of a dis
torted history for hiniscif. As the early Quakers knew so well,
man’s only hope under these circumstances lies in the “power of
the Lord” to break this enslaved condition of man and give him
a new freedom from the distorted past that he has created, It
is to this 1101w for man’s life we now turn.
VICTORY OVER SIN AND DEATH

It is inipossible from the Christian perspective to discuss the
doctrine of man without at the same time discussing the doctrine
of God. Man is nmltnnately a “theonomous being,’’ which is to say
that his life cherries froni God. Without the intervening grace
of God he cannot expect to achieve victory over sum and death.
Neither can man expect to live the life of holy obedience apart
from the sustaining power and grace of God.
If there was anything characteristic of the early Quakers, it
was their conviction of maim’s dependence upon God. Geoffrey
Nuttall has pointed out that the most characteristic phrase of
2 This implied
Fox was “the power of the Lord was over all.”
that man had access to this power and that it was this power
which would enable him to overcome sin. The early Friends
had just as deep a sense of the sin of man as did the Calvinists
of their clay, but they differed from theni by insisting that God’s
grace and power were sufficient to overcome sin, and that this
could happen for all men, not just for the elect. As necessary as
it is to face tip to the reality of sin and evil, it would he a pagan
rather than a Christian view of iman which failed to find in God’s
redemptive love and grace the answer to man’s deep-going sin.
It was certainly something of this which Fox felt when he wrote:
there was an ocean of darkness and death, but an in
“I saw
finite ocean of light and love which flowed over the ocean of
darkness. In that also I saw the infinite love of God
A major characteristic of early Friends was their belief that
a life of Christian perfection arid holiness was literally possible.
They believed that whereas all men died through the disobedi
ence of Adam, all men shall be made alive through the obedi
.

.

.
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eiice of the Perfect One—Christ. In Fox’s own conversion ex
perience he said:
Now was I come up in spirit through the flaming sword into
the paradise of God. All things were new, and all the creation
gave another smell unto me than before, beyond what words can
utter. I knew nothing but pureness, and innocency, and
righteousness, being renewed up into the image of Cod by
Christ Jesus, so that I say I was come up to the state of clam
winds he was in before he fell.31

Fox did not hold that man could sin no more, but that as he
remained obedient to the Light of Christ he would continue in
the life of perfection. Although Isaac Penington did not write
extensively about the doctrine of Christian perfection, he never
theless agreed with Fox and the other seventeenth-century
l’riends when lie said, “Is it not the will of Christ that his dis
ciples should be perfect, as their heavenly Father is perfect?
Will God dwell in an unholy temple? Will he dwell where sin
dwells?
Robert Barclay in his Apology devotes an entire Proposition
to the subject of perfection. We excerpt a few of his statements
in order to present the main theme of his argument.
We do believe, that
to those in whom Christ comes to he
“

.

.

.

formed, and the new man brought forth, and born
corruptible seed, as that birth, and man in union
naturally doth the will of God, it is possible so far
it, as not to be found daily transgressors of the law

of the in
therewith,
to keep to
of God.”33

Even though he believed thoroughly in the possibility of Chris
tian perfection Barclay is also clear that the life of Christian per
fection does “admit of growth.” We are not expected to reach
the holiness and perfection of God “but only a perfection pro
portionable and answerable to man’s measure
and [which
enables to answer what he [GodI requires of us.”
34 There is also
the possibility that those who
do not diligently attend to
that of God in the heart” will lose this state of perfection. “And
we doubt not,” says Barclay, “but many good and holy men, who
have arrived to everlasting life, have had divers ebbings and
flowings of this kind.”5 On the other hand he declares,
I
will not affirm that a state is not attainable in this life, in which
to do righteousness may be so natural to the regenerate soul, that
in the stability of that condition he cannot sin.”
36 Barclay adds
a personal note to confess that he never arrived at such a state
himself.
.

“

.

.

.
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.
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Although we have implied that for early Friends man’s chief
hope is to live a life of Christian perfection in which the life of
sin is l)lotted out, this needs further examination. The term
Christian perfection carries with it too strong an implication
that man’s primary and only responsibility is ethical. Even
though early Friends were very certain that Christian perfection
required a high level of behavior, they were first of all concerned
with a life of purity and holiness in relationship to God, belies’
ing that such a life would in turn show forth the fruits of Christ
like behavior. Arthur Roberts in his research on George Fox
has suggested that the key relationship Friends sought was one
of holiness. The word “holy” as used in the Old Testament,
would fit very well the meaning Arthur Roberts intends. Where
as sin is that which separates man from God, the holy is that
which brings him into a closer relationship with God. Coupled
with this was the idea that no one could come near the
greatness and goodness of God without being pure, so the term
“holy” gradually took on ethical implications, that one’s life
must be free from actual sins in order to be accepted by God.
Although Cecil Hinshaw and other Friends have written
extensively on Christian perfectionism as the key to early
Quakerisns, it would seem to this writer that the term used by
Thomas Kelly, “holy obedience,” indicates most clearly what the
Quaker objective really is. Such a term incorporates the empha
sis which Arthur Roberts has so well restated, namely, the pri
mary importance of man’s right spiritual relationship to God,
and secondly, the idea of Friends’ continuing concern for right
moral behavior. The first is to be found in the word “holy” and
the latter in the word “obedience.” Moreover, it definitely pro
vides for a God-centered ethic, and not a humanly contrived
moral code or standard of conduct. It also establishes the right
relationship between religion (or theology) and ethics, namely,
the primacy of the former over the latter. From a Christian
point of view ethics is never autonomous but derives its author
ity from man’s relationship to God.
There is one further consideration which must be given
brief attention, namely, the redemption or salvation of man.
From what has been said before there was no question in the
17

niiiuls of early Inends that man stood iii need ol the redciuptive
action of God through Christ to effect his final justification and
reconciliation. Today among Friends there still exists a con
serative theology which holds as strongly as ever to mnans need
for time atoning work of Christ to make possible man’s salvation.
Liberal Friends, on the other hand, have so emphasized “that of
God iii every man’’ as a inherent “built-in’’ quality of goodness
that man is believed to be able through self-discipline and selfimprovement to achieve the abundant life. It is recognized that
man is not what he ought to be, but he does not stand in need
of a Redeemer. If he resolves to follow the teachings of Jesus,
he can (10 50. Christian nurture in place of Christian redemp
tion is emphasized, rather than Christian redemption (111(1 then
Christian nurture to enable growth toward a ide ol holy 0I)CdiCl Ce.

Since in a subsequent issue ol Qunher Religious Thought it
is planned to devote an entire number to the work of Christ,
it would be out ol l)11ce to deal extensively with the subject here.
The writer wishes to state his belief, however, that within the
context of historic Ouakcrism there cannot be developed an ade
quate doctrine of man without a corresponding doctrine of Gods
redemptive action through Jesus Christ. Moreover, from an
empirical point of view it does not seem to the writer that man
is able to extricate himself from his sinful predicament without
the assistance of divine action.
Passing reference should be made to a point of view ex
pressed by several contemporary students of Quakerisni, espe
cially Lewis Benson, that for early Friends the redemptive io
was no less a corporate experience than it was an individual cx
perielice. Great emphasis is placed on Fox’s idea of the “gathered
church” as a redemptive community, within the context of which
community man’s. salvation is worked out. The writer would
think that both aspects of redemption must be stressed. Man
was created for fellowship with God and his fellowmen, and it
is only reasonable that he work out his salvation in the redemp
tive community of Christ. But it is also important for each in
dividual to appropriate the new life to himself, and to do so he
must repent, overcome his love for sin, and rededicate himself
to the will and purposes of God.
18
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Finally, from the Christia i point of view, the redemptive
action of God must not only help man to win victory over sin
but over death as well. 1he Christian hope for man does not
terminate with historical dine, but holds that there isa climen
simm of God’s Time into which man may enter. Just as God cre
ates body, mind, and spirit in the i)eginllnlg, so he recreates a
new spiritual body at the end for those whose lives have been
dedicated to himim. Friends historically have held to the view
that God can and will ‘sustain the faithful in 1)0th life and death.
‘ilierefore, a life of holy obedience here afl(l now, which Friends
declare is possible, is only prelimninamy to the life of victory over
death promised to all who would be gathered unto the Father.
In summary, one may say that Friends have always held a
high view of man. Although they are not inclined to measure
the image of God iii terms of an “original perfection,” it is quite
clear that Friends believe that niati as created by God is not
only precious in his sight but is able to respond to the Light of
Christ working within to transform and perfect his God-given
potentalities. Although Friends throughout their history have
been willing to recognize the sin of man, both as an act of will
and as a condition of the self, still their chief preoccupation has
not been with sin but with the availability of the power and
grace of God to recreate the human situation in all its dimen
sions, personal as well as social. Moreover, Friends hold that
if man is faithful to his God he will be victor over sin and death.
This victory can be known as a life of holy obedience to God
here and now, and it carries with it a hope for man in the total
economy of God’s Purposes.
Friends, therefore, not only have a high view of man, but
they also expect a great deal of him. Against the Christian
background out of which Quakerisni sprang, they hold Jesus
Christ to be not only God’s revelation of himself but the stan
clard of Christian perfection toward which man is intended to
grow and mature. But man is never left alone in this venture.
His hope lies in the fact that he stands in a divine-human rela
tionship and action in which Got! is always ready to restore man
to his rightful relationship if he will only respond in faith and
obedience.
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Comments
A. BURNS CHALMERS
When Reinhold Niebuhr was beginning to write his famous
Gifford Lectures on “The Nature and Destiny of Man” he told
a small group that he knew what his first sentence (slightly
changed in its final form) would be: ‘‘\ [an has always been
troubled about himself.” It is this siniple disquiet and question
which has been the persistent background of the most careful
analyses of man’s nature and destiny. It is the more profound
levels of man’s relation to God, the “primary relationship,”
which Wilmner Cooper examines. He has given us a concise,
accurate, and well-reasoned statement.
In commenting on this essay it will he convenient to con
sider in succession the three categories under which he views man:
image of God, sinner, and victory ovei sin and death. Each is
thoughtfully related to both the historic and contemporary views
of Friends.
I

It is one of the strengths of Wilmer Cooper’s discussion of
man as made in the image of God that he so clearly states the
Hebrew position which regards man as a “history-making crea
ture,” in whom the characteristics of decision, will, and freedom
take such a prominent iumL He takes issue with the Greek tra
dition and, in effect, rejects it. He inveighs against Friends for
misunderstanding the central biblical view of man and succumb
ing to what we might call “creeping Hellenisni.” This danger is
vividly seen in what is termed the twentieth-century heresy of
misusing the phrase “that of God in every man” to develop a
rationale for a “Quaker humanism.” The result is to veer to
ward a radical immanence with the pitfall of pantheism too close
for comfort.
With the main contention here set forth I agree. Man is
not “innately good” in Rousseau’s sense or in the sense usually
21

